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"An Analysis of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing in Regulated Industries" 
Ronald R. Braeutigam 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the economic consequences of allocating 
common costs by (1) gross revenues, (2) directly attributable costs, 
and (3) relative output levels (such as ton-miles) to determine fully 
distributed cost prices for regulated firms. The analysis 
characterizes FDC tariffs, examining the nature of the economic 
inefficiency associated with the rules, and explains how opportunities 
for entry by unregulated firms might change if Ramsey optimal pricing 
were used instead of FDC pricing. 
1. INTRODUCTION
In determining prices for the outputs of multiproduct firms, 
regulators have long been confronted with a number of difficult issues. 
Among other things one often finds the existence of economies of 
scale and costs which are shared in the production of two or more 
services. Economies of scale imply that marginal cost pricing, 
absent subsidy to the firm or multipart tariffs, will not allow the 
firm to break even. Further, shared costs cannot be unambiguously 
identified with individual products, so that any rule selected to 
1 
associated shared costs with individual services will be arbitrary. 
In practice, regulatory authorities such as the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Federal Communications Commission 
historically have determined tariffs based on so-called Fully 
Distributed (or Allocated) Costs, which we will refer to as FDC 
pricing. 2 Under this method, regulators do (somehow) allocate 
shared production costs to individual services. Each service is then 
required to generate revenues which will cover all of the costs 
associated with that service. Although it is often argued that 
there is no economic foundation for FDC pricing, this practice 
ohviously does have economic consequences. 
It is our purpose to examine three well specified FDC rules, 
each having been used in regulatory proceedings, to address the 
following questions. What are the comparative characteristics of the 
price vectors that satisfy each rule? How do these price vectors 
compare with a Ramsey optimum? Do FDC rules lead to a systematic bias 
against the production levels of certain outputs? How is the set of 
2 
FDC tariffs changed as larger profits are allowed? And finally, how 
might opportunities for entry by unregulated firms be affected by 
whether tariffs are determined by Ramsey rules or by FDC rules? 
2. FDC PRICING PRACTICES
When regulatory commissions or regulated firms address the 
problem of rate structure, they do not usually do so by gathering the 
kind of long run marginal cost and demand data that economists would 
require in a determination of efficient prices. Instead, they often 
decide what portion of the firm's total costs must be covered by 
the revenues generated by each service. To start with, each service 
is typically assigned those costs which can unambiguously be attributed 
to that service. For example, the costs of railroad passenger cars 
would be assigned to passenger service. 
ln addition to costs which are directly attributable, a 
service may also be assigned a portion of those costs which cannot be 
clearly associated with any one service. Some administrative costs 
are shared by several services. Railroad track is used in the transport 
of many kinds of freight. Electric generators serve both business 
and residential users. As these examples suggest, shared costs may 
comprise a large portion of total costs. Thus, the method of allocating 
shared costs may significantly influence the rate which may be required 
for any particular service. 
Verbal statements of allocation rules are often imprecise. 
For example, discussions of possible rules have sometimes included 
allocations based on such vague notions as "subjective social 
evaluation" and "value of service. "
3 
Even where rules have been 
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more concretely defined, detailed variations in basic FDC methods 
can lead to a large number of candidates. 4 
In this paper we will examine three rather simple types 
of FDC rules that have received some attention in the literature 
and in regulatory proceedings. The first of these, as described by 
Alfred Kahn, is the distribution of shared costs "on the basis of 
some corrnnon basis of utilization, such as minutes, circuit miles, 
message-minute-miles, gross ton-miles, MCF [thousands of cubic feet 
(of gas)], or kwh [kilowatt-hours] employed or consumed. "
5 
Friedlaender has noted that in freight transportation, "the most 
usual means of prorating is on the basis of ton-miles.116 Under this 
FDC approach, which we call the relative output method, shared costs 
are allocated in proportion to the number of units of output of each 
service. 
A second approach sometimes used is the allocation of 
shared costs in proportion to the costs that can be directly attributed 
to the various services. We call this the attributable cost method. 
Kahn notes that this method has also been used to some extent in the 
transportation industry, and that this approach to accounting also has 
been used by many unregulated firms in the ir allocation of overhead 
costs. 7 (For our purposes, overhead costs are shared costs, since 
they are typically incurred in the production of all of the services 
provided by the firm. ) 
4 
A third scheme requires allocation of shared costs in 
proportion to the gross revenues generated by each service. This 
gross revenue approach, is sometimes ·ref erred to as the "re la ti ve 
dollar value" method. As Friedlaender notes, "The ICC allocates 
overhead costs between freight and passenger services on the basis 
of revenues derived from each source. "8 
These three schemes obviously do not exhaust the list of 
candidates. Still, much can be learned about the nature of FDC 
pricing without an exhaustive list. For example, Bonbright has 
described an alternative in which "each class of service might be 
assigned a portion of the total cost equal, say, to 125 percent of 
its incremental cost. "9 We will show how this is closely related to 
the gross revenue and attributable cost methods. 
The rules we will examine have been designed to work with 
data from a single technology. There are other schemes that base 
cost allocations for one technology on the costs which would be 
incurred using an alternative technology, including some of the 
allocation methods used historically by the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(river projects) and the Federal Power Commission (natural gas) .
10 
Because these involve comparative technologies, they are beyond the 
scope of this investigation. 
Criticisms of FDC 
Regulatory proceedings involving FDC pricing focused on 
a number of potential problems with the practice. Briefly, among the 
many criticisms of the practice are the following: 
1. Fully distributed costs bear no direct relationship to
marginal costs; hence, there is no basis in economic 
efficiency for FDC pricing.
11 
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2. There exists no uniquely acceptable allocation rule. As 
Friedlaender notes, "Various means of prorating the common 
or joint costs can be used, but all of them have an 
arbitrary element and hence are dangerous to use in 
prescribing rates. "12 
3. On grounds of economic efficiency, it may sometimes be 
desirable to set a price for some service so that the 
revenues generated by a service do not cover its fully 
distributed costs. 13 
4. Because the determination of fully distributed costs is 
somewhat arbitrary, there is no economic basis for 
concluding that a service is being subsidized by other 
services if its revenues are less than its fully distributed 
14 costs. 
5. FDC pricing is anticompetitive since it prevents a supplier 
from offering a service at a proposed tariff less than an
FDC price, particularly if the proposed tariff exceeds the
. 1 f 'd' h . 15 margina cost o provi ing t e service.
6. There is circular reasoning behind the FDC practice. Tariffs 
which are determined to be "appropriate" at a given time will 
depend on the existing levels of output or revenues, and these 
in turn depend on previous tariffs. Thus fully distributed 
costs may depend on the acceptance of a prior tariff 
16 structure. 
3. FDC PRICING USING FORECAST DATA
6 
In examining tariff proposals, regulators are typically 
concerned with two major issues. First, will a proposed tariff 
generate an acceptable level of profits for the firm? Second, since 
there may be an infinite number of combinations of rate for 
individual services that will lead to any given profit level for a 
multiproduct firm, will the structure of a proposed tariff be 
acceptable? 
Consider a firm that produces n services, {1,2, • . •  , n}, in 
quantities {x1, x2, . . .  , xn
}, and denote this vector of the levels of 
outputs by �· The regulator may regard some of the costs incurred 
by the firm as unambiguously and directly attributable to the 
provision of a particular service. We denote the costs directly 
attributable to the ith service by Ci (xi) .  
W e  assume that all of the shared costs incurred by the 
firm are fixed, represented by F, so that the total costs incurred 
are C (�) , where 
C (�) 
n 
F+ L C. (x. ) 
i=l l l 
(1) 
In writing (1) , we are assuming that the firm acts to minimize the 
total cost of producing �· Of course, the total cost function also 
implicitly has factor prices among its arguments; we treat them as 
constant and suppress them in our notation. 
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We also assume that there exists an independent inverse 
demand schedule for each service, Pi (xi) ,  so that the revenue for 
the ith service can be written as Ri (xi) .  Let the revenue contribution 
above attributable costs for the ith service be Qi (xi) ,  where 
Q
i (xi) R . (x.) -C. (x.
) ,  \;/i 
1 1 1 1 
(2) 
In this analysis we restrict our attention to what we call 
the undominated region of an isoprofit contour. 
Definition: An output vector e lies on an undominated region of an 
isoprofit contour when Q� (xi) < 0, \;/i. (The prime symbol ( ') denotes 
a derivative throughout this paper. ) 
An undominated region of an isoprofit contour is illustrated in 
Figure 1 along the arc DE. This region is of primary interest since
it represents the set of prices for which there are no Pareto 
superior alternatives available to regulators. Any movement away 
from a point on the undominated region, such as point A, will 
require that either the profit level decline, or that the users of 
one of the services pay a higher price. In particular a point such 
as B is not undominated, since users of service 1 are better off at 
C, while no one else (users of service 2 and the firm itself) is 
worse off at C than at B. 
8 
x2 
D 
E 
(Isoprofit Locus) TI � TI0 
xl 
Figure 1: Undominated Output Vectors 
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Three Fully Distributed Cost Rules 
The FDC pricing problem can be stated formally as follows. 
First, the common costs, F, must be allocated among the n services. 
To each service, say service i, a fraction, f
i
, will be allocated. 
Since F must be fully distributed, we have 
n 
l f. 
i=l l 
1. (3) 
Each service will be required to generate revenues, Ri (xi), 
sufficiently large to cover both the directly attributable costs and 
the allocated portion of the common costs. Thus, the FDC requirement 
can be stated 
R
i (xi) ::: fiF +Ci (xi) , Vi. (4) 
Given any level of profits, IT0, a vector of tariffs will satisfy the 
FDC requirements if (4) is satisfied at the tariffs (p1, • . .  , pn). 
The specification of the fractions (f
1
, • . .  , fn) is arbitrary. 
As we have suggested earlier, we focus on three such rules in this 
paper. First, if the fi values are determined by gross revenues, 
then 
/', n 
f� = R. (x. )/ l R. (x. ) , Vi.l l l i=l l l 
(5) 
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If the allocations are based on directly attributable costs, 
then 
/', n 
f � = R. (x. )/ l R. (x. ) , Vi. l l l i=l l l (6) 
And if common costs are distributed according to the relative 
levels of outputs, then 
/', n 
f� = x./ l x. , Vi. l l i=l l (7) 
As noted earlier, use of the relative output rule requires 
that there exists some basic unit of measurement common to all services. 
4. FDC TARIFFS WITH ZERO PROFITS 
We now turn to the case in which FDC tariffs are determined 
for a firm that is just breaking even. This case is of interest for 
several reasons. First, FDC pricing rules prove to be most restrictive 
in the zero profit case, as we shall shortly see. Second, an 
examination of the zero profit case will permit us to compare FDC 
tariffs with Ramsey optimal tariffs. In addition, as Joskow (1974) 
has suggested, many of the rate hearings of this decade have been 
triggered by continuous, prolonged inflation, so that firms have 
struggled to avoid negative economic profits. Thus, at least in some 
cases, regulated firms may actually be operating so that near-zero 
economic profits are realized as regulators readjust rates. 
11 
We begin by noting that the FDC requirement of (4) can 
be rewritten as 
Q(xi) � fiF , IJi. 
When rr0 is zero, then 
n 
I Q.cx. )i=l 1 1 
n 
iLfiF
Together, (8) and (9) imply that 
Qi(xi) f. F 
, IJi. 
1 
F. 
Thus, when profits are zero, FDC tariffs must satisfy 
Qi(xi) 
Qj (xj ) = 
f. 
1 
f. 
J 
• IJi,j .
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
We now characterize the vector of tariffs that would satisfy 
FDC pricing rules at zero profits for each of the three allocation 
schemes, and summarize the results in rows one and two of Table 1. 
For convenience, we suppress reference to the arguments of Ri, pi' Qi' 
and Ci. First, for the allocation by relative output levels, from 
(7) and (11) it follows that at an FDC tariff 
Q/xi 
Q/xj 
pi -
Ci/xi
pj - C/xj
1 ' IJi, j . (12) 
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Thus, FDC tariffs determined by relative output levels will require 
that the dJf f erence between price and average attributable cost be 
equal for every service. 
We can perform the same operations on (6) and (11) to 
characterize the FDC tariffs for the allocation by attributable costs, 
and then use (5) and (11) to do the same for the allocation by gross 
revenues. It turns out that the zero profit FDC tariffs for these 
two allocation schemes are identical, with 
P/CC/xi) p./ (C./x.) , IJi,
j . 
J J J 
In other words, for these two methods, a zero profit FDC tariff 
(13) 
requires that the ratio of price to average attributable cost be equal 
for all services. Furthermore, these two methods are identical to the 
rule described by Bonbright under which each service would generate 
revenues equal to a given percentage markup on attributable costs.
17 
5. ZERO PROFIT FDC PRICING AND RAMSEY OPTIMALITY
As mentioned earlier, Zaj ac (1972) has shown that it may 
not be possible to reach a Ramsey optimum with an FDC pricing rule. 
In other words, at a Ramsey optimum, the revenues generated by the 
ith service need not always cover even all of the directly attributable 
costs. Without elaboration we note that this may occur particularly 
if a service exhibits decreasing marginal costs, or if there are 
strong demand complementarities among the product� of the regulated 
firm. Thus, it is not surprising that under some circumstances all 
13 
of the three FDC rules we have addressed will lead to economically 
inefficient pricing. 
In this section we characterize the systematic nature of 
the inefficiency associated with these rules. In order to draw any 
such inferences, it will be necessary to relate the attributable 
costs used by the FDC rules to the marginal costs required to determine 
efficient prices. This we do with the standard definition of the 
elasticity of scale for product i 
c. 
l. s =--i x.C'. 
(14) 
l. l. 
Substitution of (14) into (12) and (13) yields the FDC pricing rules 
shown in row three of Table 1. 
Recall that 
requires that 18 
a Ramsey optimum 
I I 
(with independent demands) 
r:,, (i - Ci ) ( . - C. )Y. = --- E. = .::...J___J_ E . (:,, = Y. 
; 
'di , j 
' 
(15) 
l. 
pi l. pj J J 
where E. is the price elasticity of demand for service i, and Y. is 
l. l. 
sometimes called a Ramsey number for market i. It is obvious that 
FDC prices will generally deviate from second best prices since FDC 
rules are based on attributable costs instead of marginal costs. As 
(14) shows, the distinction between average attributable cost and 
marginal cost disappears only when the scale eleasticity is unity. 
To investigate the nature of the inefficiency for the 
attributable cost and gross revenue methods of FDC pricing, we can 
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rewrite the FDC condition that p./p. i J 
SiC�/SjC� in terms of Yi and 
Y. as follows (see the appendix). 
J 
Y. 
i 
Y. 
E. i 
J Ej 
E. 
c' i 
i pi 
[1 - :� J (16) 
The inefficiency of the FDC method is immediately observable, since 
Y. will generally differ from Y .. More specifically, for example, if 
i J 
at an FDC tariff service i has the more elastic demand and a scale 
elasticity no less than that of service j , then Y. < Y  .. Note that if i J 
the absolute value of elasticity of demand is monotonically nonincreasing 
in each market as output increases, then a lower price in any market will 
make the corresponding Ramsey number less negative. Thus, a relative 
price change that would improve efficiency without affecting overall 
profits would be a reduction in p. relative to p .. i J 
For the special case in which the scale elasticities are 
equal (S. = S.), and this is arguably a case of some interest,19 then i J 
the FDC requirement (16) simplifies to 
Yi Ei
yj 
= 
Ej
Thus, at an FDC tariff, the market with the more elastic demand 
(17) 
(assume this is market i) will have the more negative Ramsey number. 
A . d . . 1 . ld . ff
. . 20 gain, a re uction in p. re ative to p. wou increase e iciency. i J 
We can thus conclude that when S. � S., both the gross revenue and i J 
attributable cost methods exhibit an inefficient bias against 
products with more elastic demands. A summary statement about the 
16 
bias for the case of equal (in particular, unity) scale elasticity in 
all markets is included in rows four and five of Table 1. 
For the relative output method, the nature of the bias is 
a bit more complicated. We can rewrite the FDC condition that 
p. - S.C'. = p. - S.c'. in terms of Y. and Y. as follows (see thei i i J JJ i J 
appendix). 
Y. i 
(
R� - P;) Ei [(Ci ') (S_ ')] y __..______.._ + - -- c - -c j R� - pi pi xi i xj j 
At an FDC tariff, if the difference between price and marginal 
(18) 
revenue is less in market i than in market j and if the difference 
between average attributable and marginal cost is no less in market 
i than in market j , then Y. < Y. . More efficient tariffs could be 
i J 
charged without affecting profits by.lowering p. relative to p . •i J 
For the special case in which all markets exhibit 
unitary scale elasticity, (18) becomes 
Y. 1. 
Y. 
J 
' 
� 
R� - pi 
The nature of the bias for this case sumrnarized in rows four and 
five of Table 1. 
6. FDC PRICING WITH POSITIVE PROFITS
Suppose now that the firm is allowed to earn rr0 > 0. Then 
an FDC tariff vector must satisfy the following conditions: 
and 
Ri � fiF + Ci , Vi 
I R. = F + I C. + IT0 
. ]. . ]. ]. ]. 
17 
(19) 
(20) 
However, in contrast with the zero profit case, (19) and 
(20) imply that there may be an infinite number of tariff vectors 
that satisfy the FDC requirement when profits are positive. A simple 
example serves to illustrate this point. Consider a two product 
firm. The inverse demand schedules for services 1 and 2 are 
respectively: 
pl = 50 - x1 
p2 = 40 - 2x2 . 
Further, let the total cost function be 
c 500 + 2x1 + x2 • 
In Fig. 2 we have plotted the undominated regions of the isoprofit 
curves for IT=O, IT=lOO, IT=200, and IT=250. The unconstrained profit 
maximum is at point D. K represents the first best solution, at 
which both prices equal marginal cost. The locus KD contains the 
price vectors at which the Ramsey numbers are equal in the two markets 
(see (15)). In particular, a Ramsey optimum occurs at point C, where 
P1 
25 
20 
15 
10 t- I / 
5 
K 
0 5 
D 
IT 
max
IT = 250 
IT = 200 
266. 125 
IT = 100 
I 
--------
--H 
10 15 20 
FIGURE 2. FDC PRICING EXAMPLE 
IT = 0 
25 
18 
P2 
19 
profits are zero. In addition, the zero profit FDC tariff for the 
relative output method (see (12)) is at B. Finally, the zero profit 
FDC tariffs for the gross revenue and attributable cost methods 
coincide at point A (see (13) ) .  
Note what happens to the various sets o f  FDC tariffs when 
positive profits are allowed. Any tariff vector to the "northeast" 
of the boundary EAR will satisfy (19) for the method of allocation 
by gross revenues. Any vector to the northeast of FAJ will satisfy 
(19) for the attributable cost method. Any vector to the northeast 
of GBI will satisfy (19) for the relative output method. 
Several additional observations can be made. If we restrict 
our attention to the zero profit case, the example shows that alternative 
FDC methods can lead to different directions of bias in the tariff 
vectors, relative to a Ramsey optimum. Note that A and B lie on 
opposite sides of C in the example. 
The example also shows that the FDC tariff vectors that 
satisfy the methods of allocation by gross revenues and attributable 
costs need not be identical with positive profits, even though they 
are identical in the zero profit case. It also shows that for some 
profit levels it may be possible to satisfy all three FDC rules 
simultaneously, as the segment ML does for IT= 100. Note also that 
when JI= 100, the most efficient price vector occurs at point R, since 
the Ramsey numbers are equal. Thus, in this example, the most 
efficient price vector at IT= 100 also satisfies all three FDC 
requirements, in contrast to the case with IT= 0, where none of the 
three FDC methods permitted an efficient tariff. 
20 
In summary, with positive profits a new type of arbitrary 
decision must be made, even after the choice of the FDC rule is 
specified, since many tariffs may satisfy the FDC requirements. One 
could impose more restrictive rules. For example, one could require 
that the percentage markup of price over average attributable cost 
be the same in all markets, as the method discussed by Bonbright would 
suggest. (In our example, this would correspond to a requirement that 
the tariff vector lie on the segment AU. } However, under any of the 
less restrictive allocation methods we have addressed in this paper, 
the choice of tariffs will remain ambiguous when positive profits are 
realized. 
7. FDC PRICING AND ENTRY
Before closing, we briefly Pddress some of the implications 
of FDC rules for competitive opportunities in markets for unregulated 
substitutes. Consider what may happen if an unregulated entrant 
provides a service that is a close, though imperfect substitute for 
the ith service offered by a multiproduct regulated firm that retains 
a monopoly in its other markets. Let p
i 
represent the tariff charged 
by the multiproduct firm for service i. In particular we ask whether 
a Ramsey optimal pi is likely to be higher than or lower than a pi 
determined by FDC rules. 
First, we must be specific about the notion of Ramsey 
optimality where there are unregulated entrants. In particular we 
employ the notion of "partially regulated second best" (PRSB) pricing 
developed by Braeutigam (1979).  The phrase "partially regulated" 
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refers to a form of regulation in which the prices charged by the 
multiproduct firm can be regulated, but the prices charged by the 
competitive entrants are not regulated. Thus, PRSB prices are 
those charged by the multiproduct firm that maximize consumer and 
producer surplus generated by both the regulated and unregulated 
markets, subject to a minimum profit constraint (usually a zero 
profit condition) on the regulated firm. The minimum profit constraint 
is required to keep the regulated firm from earning the negative 
profits that would be incurred at marginal cost pricing because 
there are economies of scale. If the n products of the regulated firm 
have demands independent of one another, then PRSB prices must 
satisfy (15), so that the Ramsey numbers are equal in all markets 
served by the multiproduct firm. It is important to note that the 
PRSB rules are based on the demands facing the unregulated firm 
rather than on some undefined notion of a market demand. 
How do these Ramsey optimal (PRSB) prices compare with 
FDC prices? To begin with, we observe that if positive profits are 
allowed, the answer is not at all obvious. In section six we showed 
that FDC pricing rules may generate a wide range of acceptable 
tariffs, and it will not generally be possible to state whether the 
allowed tariff for service i, the one where entry has occurred, will 
22 
assumption that the absolute value of elasticity of demand is 
monotonically nonincreasing as output increases in each market. 
First, for the gross revenue and attributable cost methods, 
we recall that p./s . c'. 
1 1 1 
p. /s . c'. at an FDC tariff. Suppose that 
J J J 
the effect of entry by unregulated competitors into market i to make 
the regulated firm's demand for i more elastic than its demand for 
j, at any FDC tariff. In addition, if S. � S., then (16) implies 1 J 
that Y. < Y . . Thus, at an FDC tariff, economic efficiency could 
l J 
be improved, without affecting profits, by lowering p
i 
relative to 
pj, a movement that would diminish the opportunities for the 
unregulated competitors. 
A similar remark can be made regarding the method of 
allocation by relative output levels. At an FDC tariff we recall 
that p. -s.c'. = p. -s.c'.. Suppose that the effect of entry is to1 1 1  J J J  
make the difference between the marginal revenue and price in market 
i smaller then the difference in market j at an FDC tariff. Then 
if the difference between average attributable and marginal cost is 
no less in market i than in market j, then (18) implies that Y. < Y. at 1 J 
an FDC tariff. Once again, economic efficiency could be improved 
without affecting profits, by lowering pi relative to pj. 
be higher or lower than the Ramsey optimal tariff at TI0 > 0. 21 8. CONCLUSION
Now let us restrict ourselves to the zero profit case, for Although it is often argued that FDC tariffs are not based 
that is the usual constraint for which Ramsey optimal tariffs are 
defined. Following the development of section five, we retain the 
on economic principles, they certainly do have economic consequences. 
This analysis of three well defined FDC rules has demonstrated 
several economic implications. 
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When positive profits are allowed, FDC requirements may 
be satisfied by a wide range of tariffs, some of which may be quite 
efficient, and others of which may be rather inefficient. FDC 
requirements are most restrictive when economic prof its are zero. 
With zero profits, the FDC tariffs that satisfy the gross revenue 
and attributable cost methods of allocating common costs are identical. 
None of these FDC rules will lead to Ramsey optimality in 
general, even when profits are zero. We have shown how the systematic 
nature of the inefficiency will depend on the elasticities of scale 
and demand. Stated imprecisely here, the basic nature of the bias 
for all three rules is this. At an FDC tariff the products with the 
most elastic demands and highest elasticities of scale will be 
priced higher relative to other products than they would be at a 
Ramsey optimum. This suggests that opportunities for unregulated 
entry into one of the markets served by a regulated firm might be 
encouraged more under zero profit FDC pricing than under a regime of 
Ramsey pricing if entry would leave the regulated firm with a highly 
elastic demand in the entered market. 
Extensions of this line of research might take a number of 
directions. As we stated at the outset, there are many forms of FDC 
rules other than the three we have addressed, many of which are 
poorly defined, and some of which are quite complicated. Other work 
may focus on the existence of variable common costs, interdependent 
demands, costs common to proper subsets of services, and more 
complicated forms of regulation, including, for example, the 
combination of FDC pricing with rate of return regulation. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The term "shared costs" will be used to include both "joint 
costs" (in which the ratio of the level of one output to another 
is fixed) and " common costs" (in which outputs can be produced 
in variable proportions) . 
2. The ICC confirmed the practice of FDC pricing in Docket 34013, 
337 ICC 298, July 30, 1970; the FCC did so in Docket 18128/18684, 
61 FCC 2d, November 26, 1976, p. 606. 
3. See, for example, the rather extensive discussions in Bonbright 
(196la) chapter 18, and Bowman, et al. (1976) . The vagueness of 
"subjective social evaluation" is- obvious; for more on "value 
of service," see Locklin (1972) , pp. 157-162. 
4. For example, as Bonbright (196lb) notes, in 1953 and 1957 the 
Illinois Commerce Commission refused to order the Commonwealth 
Edison Company of Chicago to make a fully distributed cost study 
in support: of a proposed rate increase, because there were at 
least "twenty-nine rival formulas for the allocation of capacity 
costs alone -- formulas each of which had received some 
professional sponsorship. " (See pages 306 and 307. ) 
5. See Kahn (1970) , p. 151. 
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6. Friedlander (1969), p. 133. 
7. Kahn (1970) , p. 151. On p. 78, in commenting on this common 
practice, Kahn notes, "The assumption presumably is that the 
greater the quantity and the higher the cost of labor and 
materials used in fabricating a product, the greater also will 
be the quantity and value of equipment employed in its production, 
the draft on the time and attention of inspectors . • . . " 
8. See Friedlaender (1969), p. 32. Also see Bowman (1976). The 
so-called "relative sales volume" method has been employed in the 
meat packing industry to allocate administrative costs to 
individual production plants. Under this scheme the administrative 
costs are assigned to individual plants according to prior
dollar sales volumes. 
9. Bonbright (196lb) , p. 309. 
10. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority allocated the shared 
costs of river development projects among the various services 
(navigation, electric power, and flood control) in proportion to 
what "it would have cost to provide each of those services in 
the same quantity in single-purpose projects set up exclusively 
for them. " See Kahn (1970) p. 151, and Federal Power Commission 
(1949) . -A similar method (the "relative cost method") was used by 
the FPC to allocate the joint costs incurred on leases producing 
both oil and gas. Again see Kahn (1970) p. 151, and Federal 
Power Commission (1965) . 
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11. See the "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Bell System 
Respondents, " FCC Docket 18128/18684, March 12, 1973, pp. 144-145. 
12. See Friedlaender (1969) , p. 133. 
13. See Zajac (1972) for a rigorous example of this point. In less 
rigorous terms Locklin ( 1972) has made a similar point (see p. 168) . 
14. See the Bell System "Proposed Findings • . " (footnote 11) , 
pp. 158-159. 
15. See the testimony of Dr. James Bonbright, FCC Docket 18128/18684,
p. 10590 of the transcript. 
16. There are a number of other problems with FDC pricing discussed 
elsewhere. For example, should the fully distributed costs of a 
service reflect the extent to which the historical total costs of 
the firm were affected by the presence of the service? Should 
current replacement costs be used instead of historical costs? 
These familiar questions transcend the issue of FDC pricing. 
For a good surrunary, see Kahn (1970) , pp. 151-158. 
17. See n. 9 above. Bonbright refers to a markup on incremental 
costs, which are usually defined for, say service 1, as
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C (x
1, x2, 
. . .  , xn
) - C (O, x2, . . .  , xn). Under the cost structure used 
in our work, incremental costs and attributable costs are
clearly identical. Under a more complicated cost structure 
in which shared costs are not fixed, the concepts are not 
identical. 
18. The rules for a Ramsey Optimum, as derived by Baumol and 
Bradford (1970) , maximize the sum of consumer and producer 
surplus subject to a minimum profit constraint. At second 
best, the minimum profit constraint is equivalent to a 
nonnegativity constraint. However, one could in principle 
maximize the sum of the surpluses subject to any minimum 
profit level, (IT� IT0), and derive the necessary conditions of 
(15). 
19. The ICC estimates rail costs using a functional form which 
characterizes marginal costs (or, so-called out-of-pocket, or
average variable costs) as constant. Under the ICC procedure, 
shared costs are viewed, as fixed, and each service has constant 
average variable costs attributable to each service. For a 
critique of this practice, see Friedlaender (1969), especially 
pages 28 through 34, and Appendix A. 
20. 
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the condition for an FDC In particular, if Si 
tariff will be p. /c'. 
1 1 
sj = 1, then 
p./c '. (i. e. , 
J J 
that the price-marginal cost 
ratios are equal in each market). This is familiar within the 
general literature on second best. That condition does solve 
the problem of maximizing the sum of producer and consumer surplus 
given a maximum constraint on total costs. However, the FDC 
solution is not Ramsey Optimal when E. t E., since the sum of 
1 J 
the surpluses can be increased without affecting the level of 
profits. 
21. As noted earlier, the Ramsey optimal tariff is usually determined 
given a minimum profit constraint of zero profits. However, one 
could satisfy (15) given a minimum profit constraint different 
from zero. Recall that the segm�nt KD in Fig. 4 represents the 
locus of such tariffs in the example of section six. 
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APPENDIX 
Derivation of (16) . 
Thus 
and 
From (13) and (14) we obtain 
pi/pj sic�/sjc� 
pi -C� _ p j SiC� 
� - piSjC J 
(Pj -c�)
-
c�
+ 
sic�c� 
Pi SjCJpipj 
[C\-
i
c� ) ci] cj = [(¥) cj] C -i c� pi [1-:; ]cicj
which can be restated as (16) in the text. 
Derivation of (18) . 
We rewrite (12) as 
Pi -< - ( C/xi -<) 
Thus, 
I 
' ) P. -c. - (c./x. -c . .
J J J J J 
[(Pi -c�) J _ [(p. -c'. )  J ci P. ci [(ci ' ) (c. ' )] --- c. - .:...L__J_ E. _ _J_ + - - - C. - _J_ - C. pi i pj J pi cj pi xi i xj J 
We arrive at (18) by using the fact that 
p . ;jp. x . 
.:i=__:_:_.i_ _l.p 
Cj dXj pj 
j 
I ,  
Rj - pj . 
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